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Lines in the Ocean: thinking with the 
sea about territory and international 
law 
“La mer, la mer, toujours recommence” (The sea, the sea, forever restarting) 
- Paul Valery, Le Cimetière Marin (The Graveyard by the sea) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article considers the way that international law constructs space by focusing on the sea. 
Taking seriously the role of the sea in the history and present of international law provokes 
new challenges to how we understand the way international law orders, controls and 
creates physical spaces.  
INTRODUCING THE SEA 
In Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, chapter 14, or the 14th plateau, is 
entitled ‘1440: The Smooth and the Striated’.1 1440 was the year of the Portuguese 
revolution in navigation.2 It is the sea which is the smooth. It is a place characterised by 
intensities and events; it is nomadic, chaotic, amorphous and non-formal. Striation is the 
process of imposing order upon this smooth space, homogenising it, marking it out with 
grids and lines, and making it disciplined, predictable and comprehendible. The ‘very special 
problem of the sea’ is that, whilst it is the definitive smooth space, it was also the first 
smooth space to be subjected to ‘increasingly strict striation’.3 This occurred as ‘maps with 
meridians, parallels, longitudes, latitudes and territories gridded the oceans, making 
distances calculable and measurable’.4 The process of drawing and enforcing lines 
contributes to the development of international law. The history of the regulation of ocean 
space is also the history of international law’s relationship with space more generally.  
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The making of lines on maps is particularly significant as part of the practice of territory. 
Territory has been subject to sustained examination in human geography recently.5 Joe 
Painter gives an overview of different attempts to define territory, before settling on an 
understanding of territory as ‘not an actual state space, but as the powerful, metaphysical 
effect of practices that make such spaces appear to exist.’6 Stuart Elden, in his excellent 
genealogy of the concept, defines territory as ‘a bounded space under the control of a group 
of people, usually a state’.7 Territory is an historical, geographical, and political concept, 
which constantly needs exercising and performing. It is also a juridical concept, which as 
lawyers we can contrast with land.8 Land and territory are the same relation as smooth and 
striated, with territory being the effect of practices over land which makes it bounded and 
controlled. In the emergence of the concept of territory, Elden finds that the Portuguese, 
navigation, and the 15th century are important also. It is here that Elden finds the first 
attempts to claim land through calculation and cartography, rather than by discovery or 
occupation.9 This is the claim to territory, rather than simply land.  
Thinking with the sea is an idea developed in the work of Phil Steinberg.10 Steinberg has 
repeatedly drawn attention to the physicality of the sea. Whilst on land, ‘points are fixed in 
space and mobile forces are external to those points’,11 the sea is in constant motion. This 
does not mean that it does not have identifiable places and natures, but these places are 
not ‘located’.12 Steinberg argues that: ‘The ocean is not a world of stable places that are 
impacted by moving forces. Rather, in the ocean, moving matter constitutes places, and 
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these places are specifically mobile’.13 Recognition and appreciation of the mobility or 
fluidity of ocean space unsettle our understanding of geopolitics, and help us appreciate 
that order is ‘dynamic and continually reconstituted’.14 This understanding is Steinberg’s 
‘ocean ontology’,15 an understanding of the essential fluidity of the geo-political world. Land 
also moves and changes, but this is more readily understood at sea. For my argument the 
sea offers both the construction of space as flat and empty and the challenge to that 
construction, this is the process of striation and smoothing.  
In this article I will use the concepts of smooth and striated to consider the organisation of 
space in international law, particularly ocean space. The law makes these abstract lines of 
territory have material effects. When the physical world fails to live up to law’s certainty, 
then serious violence can be done, whether it is the historical dispossession of a native 
population or the contemporary European refugee crisis. It is at sea that international law 
has developed many of its spatial elements. The sea has been understood as flat, empty and 
featureless, and this understanding has influenced the way international law constructs 
space more generally.  
In the first part of this article I set out to understand the sea. I do this primarily through 
attention to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Elden, and Steinberg. I am drawing on 
geography to explain the construction of ocean space in international law.16 Recent 
scholarship and recent events have highlighted the relevance these two disciplines have for 
each other. Daniel Bethlehem has drawn attention to the ways that processes of 
globalisation and the rise of international non-state actors have reduced the significance of 
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the state in international law.17 At the same time the European refugee crisis, a crisis of the 
sea and a crisis of states, has seen the reinforcement and fortification of sovereign 
borders.18  It is timely to understand that the sea has always been constructed in this 
conflicting way, open and closed, free and controlled. Our attention must be on for whom 
the sea is free, the border open, and who the law historically shuts out, subjugates and 
excludes.   
I will then apply this geographic thought to the history of international law of the sea. The 
sea has been progressively striated, whilst always susceptible to becoming smooth once 
more. This conflict can be seen from two key moments in early modern international law: 
the Treaty of Tordesillas and Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum. I put these texts in context, and 
examine the relationship between law and geography in this period, and the operation of 
striation and smoothing of ocean space. The history of admiralty courts then dominates the 
development of international law at sea in practice, before in the 20th century the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempts to finally settle this legal 
regime in a multilateral treaty. The argument ends by returning to individuals and their 
experiences of the striation of both land and sea by considering refugees.  
WHAT IS THE SEA?  
“Where are your monuments, your battles, martyrs? 
Where is your tribal memory? Sirs, 
in that grey vault. The sea. The sea 
has locked them up. The sea is History” 
- Derek Walcott, The Sea is History 
Before looking beyond international law, there are two theoretical engagements with the 
sea from within international law which can provide provocative starting points. Carl 
Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth and Philip Allott’s article ‘Mare Nostrum’ offer two rare 
and contrasting engagements with the sea by international lawyers, and provide a starting 
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point for how international lawyers have understood the sea. In Nomos Schmitt argues that 
‘the spatial ordering of the earth in terms of international law’ emerged as a wholly new 
problem at the end of the 15th century with European discovery of the new world and then 
the circumnavigation of the globe.19 Schmitt also emphasises Tordesillas, and the 
accompanying advances in the technology of navigation and measurement, as leading to a 
‘global linear thinking’, that as soon as the globe could be comprehended as a whole, it had 
to be divided.20 Schmitt outlines the ways in which international law and political theory at 
this time provided a basis for a new appreciation of the spatial ordering of the globe. These 
developments of course happen at sea. 
Schmitt considered the importance of the sea to be its difference from the land. Not just the 
basic physical differences, but the different way that the sea is subjected to law, order and 
control. The land can be directly invested in to produce value; it is visibly transformed by 
work upon it and it can be physically demarcated and enclosed.21 The sea, however, shares 
none of these features. For Schmitt, ‘the sea has no character, in the original sense of the 
word...meaning to engrave, to scratch, to imprint. The sea is free’.22 When Schmitt 
considered the sea, he found ‘on the waves, there is nothing but waves’,23 or as Steinberg 
puts it, for Schmitt the sea is ‘quite literally a space without geography’.24  
Schmitt’s concept of a sea without substance is fundamentally flawed, but it is the concept 
of the sea which dominates the history of international legal engagement with the sea. As 
Steinberg argues, this conceptualisation misses the physical reality of the sea.25 However, it 
does lead Schmitt to a set of productive questions which I am also exploring here, from a 
similar starting point. Schmitt sees an ‘historical and structural relation between such spatial 
concepts of free sea, free trade, and free world economy, and the idea of a free space in 
which to pursue free competition and free exploitation’.26 The concept of the free sea plays 
an important role at the beginning of international law, and in the present. The freedom of 
the high seas and the general principle of freedom of navigation survive in UNCLOS. These 
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two enunciations of the freedom of the seas bookend a period in which international law 
has been variously and compellingly accused of structuring the world around imperialist, 
capitalist exploitation.27 Serious consideration of the sea can illuminate this development. 
The sea needs re-examining, as does the concept of freedom at sea. For Schmitt, the ‘free 
sea’ has been ‘a matter of differently assessed constructions and of the free play of 
forces’.28 It has justified everything from ‘a zone free for booty ... [where] there [are] no 
limits, no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no sacred orientations, no law, and no 
property’29 to a ‘free space for commerce designated for agonal tests of strength’,30 ‘where 
state powers are “free” to suppress those who would challenge the established rules 
governing “free” trade’.31  
It is worth adding Elden’s criticisms of Schmitt’s geopolitics here.32 Whilst Schmitt is 
describing the emergence of territory in Europe in this period, and this understanding of the 
sea is crucial to that, Schmitt sees the calculative ordering of space in this way as lacking a 
‘spiritual, Völkish sense of place’.33 Nomos is reactionary text, and its central ideas were 
developed in the context of advocating for a German Groβraum. Nomos serves as a rare 
example of engagement between international law, international relations, and geography, 
but its themes and ideas are largely clichéd and under developed. It lacks any understanding 
of the role of the imperial corporations in this period for example. The problems Schmitt 
found in the free sea and territory could in fact be more powerfully attributed to a 
complicity in this geographic thinking with the calculative strategies of capitalism.34  
Philip Allott unsurprisingly saw in the sea far more hope than Schmitt did.35 Where Schmitt,  
saw no meaning in the ‘freedom’ of the sea, Allot saw great potential in the law of the sea.36 
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For Allott, UNCLOS is ‘the product of a total international social process extending back, 
philosophically and historically, to the sixteenth century and far beyond’.37 Whilst for the 
most part the treaty is ‘an actualisation of well-known conceptual structures’, the variety of 
lines of demarcation and jurisdictional zones, it also ‘contains within itself the potential 
negations of those structures and hence the potentiality of a structurally new law of the 
sea’.38 These potential negations are found in part XI, on the international seabed and in 
part V, where the exclusive economic zone envisages ‘a system of social management’.39 
UNCLOS also contains a general concern for social objectives, particularly the environment, 
and ultimately ‘when the Convention is seen as a whole, its Gestalt seems to be much more 
that of a public law system than that of a contractual arrangement’.40 For Allott, UNCLOS 
recognises that the space of the sea is never simply a question of one state’s rights in 
relation to another. The sea is the space where the international community ceases to be an 
abstract idea and becomes real, in the interplay of the variety of different rights and duties 
which exist in the ocean space.  
Allott’s thoughts are not as abstract and idealised as they may seem. Despite the failure of 
ideas such as the Enterprise to actually come into existence, the idea of a community 
interest in the sea has taken hold. Looking at the contents page of a recent textbook on the 
law of the sea shows that the subject can be doctrinally allocated between ‘Divided Oceans’, 
the question of jurisdiction, and ‘Common Oceans’, the question of community interests.41 
This is more than an echo of Allott’s distinction between the ‘property approach’ and the 
‘government approach’.42  
A couple of less optimistic points in response to Allott must also be made. Firstly, the EEZ 
can be seen as an extension of territorialisation of the seas, an increase in the reach of 
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property. The contents of the ocean are increasingly valuable and therefore subject to 
commodification and privatisation, being removed from the commons. This is how 
Steinberg understands the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement,43 as a ‘creeping enclosure 
movement’.44 Part XI deserves even more scrutiny. This part of UNCLOS covers the 
international sea bed, and Allott’s hope is drawn from the designation of this area as ‘the 
common heritage of mankind’.45 The main resource on the deep sea bed are manganese 
nodules. This principle, of a resource belonging to all, and to be exploited for the benefit of 
all, was revolutionary. It was a key part of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
and of the Third World Movement more generally.46 
The First World opposed these developments as against the fundamental need for 
competition in production under capitalism. These states, led by the United States, 
proposed that the International Seabed Authority should license the mining of these 
resources, distributing tax revenues to less developed nations.47 However, it remains 
remarkable that these negotiations happened at all, and demonstrates the importance of 
securing the rest of UNCLOS for these states. As it turned out, the global recession of the 
1970s, and increasing understanding of the practical difficulties in mining the deep sea bed, 
meant that much of this became irrelevant. Agreements reached in the UNCLOS 
conferences in the early 1970s were all but forgotten in the 1980s. By the 1990s and the 
Implementation Agreement,48 with the end of the Cold war, the end of the NIEO, and the 
triumph of neoliberalism, Part XI was no longer important. This spirit of cooperation and 
development was long over. The agreement introduced free market principles over the 
deep sea bed, and left the principle of common heritage an empty shell.49 The Enterprise, 
which would mine the deep seabed, exists only on paper.  
On the question of the deep sea bed, international law ultimately constructed this space as 
empty and featureless once again, but it flirted with an alternative. This way of 
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understanding the ocean fits with the dominant, economic, use of the ocean at the 
moment, for movement of goods. As this changes though, then the understanding of the 
space may change. The potential of manganese nodules almost created this, and if the 
dominant use or understanding of the space changes, the story of manganese nodules 
illustrates how quickly the construction of the space can change too.  
The Sea in Theory – The Smooth and the Striated  
Different understandings of ocean space can be found outside of international law. The sea 
is Deleuze and Guattari’s archetype of a smooth space, a space of events and intensities, 
nomadic and amorphous. It is a dot between two lines. Striated space is the opposite. A 
formally planned city is the disciplined counterpoint to the sea. This is a line between two 
dots. Smooth and striated spaces, while set up as oppositions or binaries, are actually 
interdependent. This is a relationship of simultaneity, not of dialectics; they are related as a 
form of translation. The intense magnitude of the smooth can be the infinite distance of the 
striated. So the sea, because it is such a perfectly smooth space, always demands striation, 
from nomadic navigation based on ‘wind and noise’ to complex maps with longitude and 
latitude.50 The sea is the first space that was striated, and this model was taken and applied 
to other smooth spaces. But, striated spaces constantly produce new smooth spaces as well. 
The city, which is the archetypal striated space, produces smooth spaces, either in shanty 
towns which leak out of the edges, or simply in the movement of people through the city ‘as 
a nomad’.51 
Nomads, in Deleuze and Guattari’s argument, do not actually ‘move’.52 They are always in 
place, always hold a smooth space. The nomad is settled wherever they are, such as the 
Bedouin in their tent. The International Court of Justice Advisory opinion on Western Sahara 
gives us a very literal example of international law striating the smooth space.53 The smooth 
and striated are in opposition, such as the relation between the point and the line. They can 
also be characterised as other oppositions, such as between allocation and distribution.54 
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Allocated, striated, space is closed off and broken up, such as enclosed agriculture or the 
zoning of a city. Distribution is the use of space by the nomadic animal raiser, or the 
cultivator as opposed to the farmer. But they are also directly connected, smooth space is 
always striated, and the most striated space always gives rise to new smooth space. This 
allows us to understand the construction of space as endlessly dynamic, always open to 
challenge and always containing multiplicity and possibility. ‘Smooth spaces are not in 
themselves liberatory’,55 Deleuze and Guattari conclude, but they do allow different forms 
of struggle and different forms of living. The creation of a smooth space is an attempt to live 
differently to the order and organised striation of space. 
This simultaneity, this constant process of smoothing and striating which begins at sea is 
also fundamental to the process of territorialisation. Territory is more than terrain because 
it is control of the land no matter what the terrain is, mountains, lakes, uninhabitable 
dessert, all can be territory. Territory, as Elden argues, is calculated and enforced, it is a 
political technology.56 Spatial relations are constantly reconfigured in this process, with 
territory appearing by turns weaker and stronger. The violent territorialisation involved in 
making the world into States is for some people deterritorialized in globalisation, either the 
free movement enjoyed by the rich and powerful or the dislocated migrant.57 This will 
always lead to a reterritorialization, power has to be located, it has to be territorialized.58 
The migrant or refugee seeks a reterritorialization, either in a return to a changed place or 
the finding of a new place.  
This process of line drawing, or striation and the inevitable smoothing, also happens at a 
smaller scale than the state. In Foucauldian terms, it is an aspect of micro power, the 
striation of the body. In particular this is how Deleuze reads Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, 
as a piece of radical cartography, understanding the lines that are drawn by panopticism, by 
discipline as a social technology pre-existing the actual institutions.59 Deleuze describes this 
social technology as a diagram.60 Technology is social before it is material, so the need to 
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discipline exists before the prison, just as the idea of controlling space through calculation 
led the development of the technologies of navigation. The abstract lines drawn on the 
world are in this analysis the same as the abstract lines that are drawn on or into people, 
marking them (sometimes literally) as prisoners, internees, or refugees.61  
The sea provides a provocative change of perspective on how international law orders 
space, and that this ordering has effects all the way down to individuals. However, the 
observations so far are in danger of becoming too abstract. The physical geography of the 
ocean can also add something to this analysis.  
The Sea in Practice – Constructing the Ocean Differently  
Steinberg reads Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the smooth ocean as reduceing the sea to 
merely a symbol, an idealised ‘signifier for a world of shifting, fragmented identities, 
mobilities and connections’.62 This ‘over-theorising’ ignores the ‘actual lives of individuals 
who experience and interact with the sea on a regular, or even occasional, basis’.63 The first 
step towards reasserting the physical reality of the ocean, to ‘getting wet’, is to recognise 
‘the actual work of construction ... that transpires to make a space what it is’.64 Actual 
experiences of the sea must be considered, particularly, but not only, human experiences. 
‘Life at sea’ cannot be reduced to merely ‘life on ship’.65 Nonetheless, this perspective is a 
productive starting point when thinking about international law. The ‘more than human’ 
elements of the sea need also to be understood, specifically its liquid nature, ‘as emergent 
with, and not merely an underlying context for, human activities’.66 
The ‘rethinking’ which Steinberg advocates has three main steps: observing the ocean and 
its movement, thinking about how this movement changes our idea of ocean regions and 
boundaries, and rethinking the binary between land and sea. Essentially this process takes 
the ‘empty’ ocean of Schmitt, or the ‘smooth’ ocean of Deleuze and Guattari, and fills it in 
again, with the physical properties of the sea. Rethinking the ocean as a moving space starts 
from physical geography, and two different schools of oceanography: Eulerian and 
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Lagrangian.67 Eulerian oceanographers measure the forces acting on stable buoys. This 
‘mimics the terrestrial spatial ontology wherein points are fixed in space and mobile forces 
are external to and act on those points’.68 Steinberg’s preference is for Lagrangian 
modelling, which instead maps the movement of “floaters” in three-dimensional space. 
From this perspective ‘movement, instead of being subsequent to geography, is 
geography’.69  
This thinking is particularly responsive to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the smooth and 
striated ocean. In striated spaces ‘the line is between two points’, whereas in the smooth, 
‘the point is between two lines’.70 Similarly, the Eulerian perspective sees the sea as a line 
between two points, with Steinberg suggesting the line between London and New York.71 
From the Lagrangian perspective, the point is mobile, it moves freely between the lines, and 
in turn helps us understand London and New York ‘exist as they are only in their continual 
reconstruction through flows of connectivity’.72 The understanding of a place then needs to 
consider all possible connections and flows. 
The second step, ‘rethinking the region’, is particularly relevant for the law of the sea. This is 
questioning the basis on which we demarcate regions at sea, again by emphasising that the 
sea moves. Obviously, this parallels a major shared concern of geographers and 
international lawyers on land, the question of where to draw a boarder, why and how, can 
be endlessly debated. This question at sea though takes on a particular importance because 
it is, remembering Schmitt’s similar observation, so difficult to physically mark space at sea. 
This means that any lines we draw in the ocean ‘speak not with the authority of a 
geophysicality that cannot be fully grasped but with the authority of a juridical system that 
conceivably can’.73 This throws into sharp relief the conflicting nature of the certainty of 
law’s abstract enunciation and the uncertainty of the world.  
This opposition between line drawing’s, and therefore law’s, fictional stability, and the 
ocean’s physical and real fluidity, should direct us to consider mobility again. This conflict is 
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present wherever law and space interact, with the law controlling and ordering the use of 
space. The law, particularly international law of the sea, can be too often reduced to what is 
permitted and prohibited in certain spaces. To emphasise fluidity is to emphasis social 
practices and institutions, and ultimately movement, action or process rather than location.  
The final step is in ‘rethinking land-sea binaries’.74 This is to recognise that the world is not 
neatly split into ‘land and water’.75 This binary produces an understanding of the land as the 
place where ‘society’ exists, whereas the sea is simply a zone of exchange.76 It can be 
broken down in geography by the study of areas which do not easily fit into either camp, 
such as swamps, islands or sea ice. This binary is not just a bias of geography, but is also very 
apparent in international law and international politics more generally. The inside, of land, 
states and territories, is opposed to the outside of the external seas. This is also a basis for 
ideas of inviolable sovereignty on the land, on the inside. It is also part of Schmitt’s interest 
in the sea, as this external/internal divide gives a geographic and physical counterpart to the 
idea of spaces of exception.77 This opposition is why Allott found the law of the sea so 
promising; the sea is easily conceptualised as beyond state control, and so does not face the 
problem of overcoming sovereignty when asserting community interests. The sea has been 
and to some extent continues to be a space without sovereignty. To take that lesson back 
onto dry land would be a move at unsettling this binary.78 
The featureless ocean between places, something which is only to be crossed, is what 
Steinberg seeks ultimately to oppose:  
This representation serves modernity well, as it reproduces the idea that the world 
consists of, on the one hand, static terrestrial points on the “inside” that may be 
settled, developed, and grouped into states and, on the other hand, aqueous points 
on the “outside” that, due to the absence of properties that enable settlement and 
territorialisation, may be written off as beyond society.79 
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This is also a feature of international law, when it only concerns itself with the relations of 
states. However, the inside/outside distinction is more widespread, particularly when 
international law is seen as ‘outside’ the state, and so nothing to do with the society which 
exists ‘inside’. International law wears this mask of being outside the state, but very 
obviously has effects on the inside, most obviously when we think of trade as Grotius did. 
Striated and smooth, space and place, empty and full, territory and landscape. In Deleuzian 
terms, the concept of the smooth and striated is nomadic.80 It is also a diagram, that is it 
displays the relations between forces.81 The law is an abstract machine which imposes 
concrete assemblages, that is the law makes a line on a map have the power to allocate 
resources, determine identity, and tell us who gets to be a citizen and who a refugee.82 
Abstract spatial ideas are given their certainty and brutal reality through international law. 
The European refugee crisis gives us a very contemporary example of the violence which 
arises from lines drawn in empty spaces. 
The ocean as a place 
If we can understand the physical reality of the seas, we can start to understand the sea as a 
place, rather than as a space.83 This distinction is a complex and contested concept in 
cultural geography, and my application of it here is unavoidably quite crude. For my 
purposes, space is abstract and absolute, whereas place is constructed through social 
practices such as naming, gathering and interacting. This distinction between space and 
place can also help examine how international law shapes space, and the people within it. It 
is not just people that make a place, as Bruno Latour has argued, ‘objects too have 
agency’.84 Those objects at sea which seem most obvious are ships and fish, but the sea 
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itself must be kept in mind, and its movement. To attempt to understand this I draw on two 
pieces of literature in which the sea is a place.85 
The sea, and particularly life on, in and next to the sea, are subjects of careful meditation in 
Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea.86 The old man talks to the sea, it is a definite 
character within the story. When the man sails out and sets his lines, he does so with an 
appreciation of the different depths of the sea, and what happens at each level. The fish 
near the surface help him, such as those he eats to sustain him, and his principle friends are 
flying fish. The birds in the sky guide him to good fishing areas, and also provide company 
when they land on his boat, which in turn allows them to rest far out at sea. The marlin 
which he catches is a character who the man talks with, competes with and is literally joined 
with. When the sharks come and eat the marlin, the man apologises to the fish for failing it, 
for taking its life without any gain. He himself is destroyed when the fish is destroyed. 
Nature participates actively in this story, and the sea is not simply personified, it is a place. 
But it is not, and cannot be, a place like a place on land. The sea moves. Movement 
constitutes the ocean space, and so to turn it into a place is to move with it. Santiago, the 
old man in Hemingway’s novel, moves with the sea. He moves out beyond not just the sight 
of the land but beyond the smell of the land, to try and improve his luck. He goes past 
different places, past the Gulf weed, past the wells, past the great well, to the place where 
the schools of albacore are. These are definite places in the novel, some denoted by the 
underwater features, some by what is near the surface. When he hooks the marlin, he 
travels with it for three days, going where it goes, never truly fearing that he won’t find his 
way back again. When he has caught the marlin, he is able to sail back by the feel of the 
wind. The old man is entirely at home at sea, understands its depths, and produces a 
genuine sense of place.  
A second example of the sea as a place in literature, which also gives a subaltern 
perspective, can be found in the work of the poet Derek Walcott. Lots of Walcott’s poetry 
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concerns the sea in some way. His poem ‘The Sea is History’87 features a voice questioning 
the author about the lack of history in his culture. Walcott is from Saint Lucia, and his 
Caribbean archipelagic identity is hugely important. The author responds to the questions, 
such as ‘where is your Renaissance?’ by referring to the sea. The sea contains or makes up 
this history, both in terms of a cultural identity constructed around being part of an 
archipelago,88 and for its part in slavery and mass transportation of people from Africa. The 
sea did not bring history, or allow history to happen, it is history. The space/place of the sea, 
for Walcott, is history. This construction of ocean space is behind the naming of the Black 
Atlantic,89 naming it as the space between the different sites, but also recognising that the 
sea allows for and contributes to the interlocking of these histories, and the production of a 
specific identity and history of its own. 
This literature allows us to gain an insight into how different people experience the sea, and 
how the sea can be understood differently. It captures what Anna Ryan describes as ‘the 
constant flux ... the flowing materiality’ of the sea, as surface becomes depth, and depth 
rises from below to become surface again.90 We also see here a link back to Steinberg and 
Peters’ ideas around ocean ontology, about understanding the world as constantly shifting 
and changing, and as having volume. This is an understanding of space which brings out the 
political struggles constantly happening around us, it is a potent re-engagement with where 
we are and how law has shaped it 
Understanding the sea as a place is a radical move which resonates with the radical 
geography of thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre and Doreen Massey. For Lefebvre abstract 
space is created by capital. This is space produce by economic transactions, spatial practices 
of commodification, and representations of space through planning and surveillance.91 
Place, or in Lefebvre’s terms concrete space, is ‘the realm of the lived’, a reaction against 
capitalisms abstraction. Capitalism is flows and movement through space, and the reaction 
to this is to be located and exist in a place. These ideas clearly communicate with the ideas 
of Deleuze and Guattari. 
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Doreen Massey’s work also resonates strongly here.92 In Massey’s work places are 
‘constructed out of particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social 
processes, experience and understandings, in a situation of co-presence’.93 Place is about 
location, identity, relationships, and the experience of living somewhere. Places are 
experienced in different ways by different people, and asserting this plurality and specificity 
of place against the empty and singular form of space is at the heart of Massey’s progressive 
project.  
Having complicated the possible understandings of ocean space, and space under 
international law more generally, in the second half of this article I now turn to the ways 
that international law has regulated the sea, and ultimately focusing on the contemporary 
crisis of the sea, and the most pressing political problem of today, the refugee crisis.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT SEA 
 “Man marks the earth with ruin; his control  
Stops with the shore” 
 – Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage 
The history of international law at sea can be given a variety of starting places. Roman 
stewardship of the Mediterranean might be one, if we were trying to tell a story of 
international law’s ancient origins.94 The Code of Malacca, governing the Indian Ocean in 
the late 13th century, would help us tell an interesting subaltern history.95 However, I am 
starting with one of the most famous lines in the ocean, the line of demarcation declared in 
four Papal Bulls of 1493, and moved by agreement between Castile and Aragon (Spain), and 
Portugal, under the Treaty of Tordesillas. This line started a debate that informed some of 
the most famous early modern texts in international law. 
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In this section I start with the Treaty of Tordesillas, before moving to another foundational 
text in international law, Grotius’ Mare Liberum. The history of that text being produced out 
of an admiralty court dispute leads into a focus on the history of those courts. These courts 
dominate into the 20th century. Contemporary law of the sea starts with UNCLOS, and its 
sophisticated regime of spatial organisation at sea. This half of the article culminates by 
looking at the effects of this spatial regulation on people, in particular on refugees. 
The Treaty of Tordesillas 
15th century exploration saw the ‘discovery of the sea’.96 Developments in this period 
included the ‘discovery’ of America and the successful navigation of the southern tip of 
Africa. The sea is vital to understanding this period, which also heralds the beginning of 
modern imperialism and colonialism, the growth of mercantilism, the start of international 
law and the birth of territory.97 It also features an early and hugely significant attempt at 
drawing a line in the ocean, the imposition of legal fiction onto geographical fact.  
In 1493 four Papal Bulls were issued which divided the globe into a Spanish western 
hemisphere and a Portuguese eastern hemisphere. This line, placed at 100 leagues west of 
the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, gave Spain exploration rights to the west, and Portugal 
to the east. A year later, the Spanish and Portuguese signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, which 
moved the line to 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.98 This line is typically 
assumed to divide the world into a Spanish western hemisphere and a Portuguese eastern 
one. This is how Grotius characterised it in Mare Liberum,99 how Thomas Fulton understood 
it at the beginning of the 20th century,100 and how it has been explained in more recent 
histories.101  
This early attempt to mark off the ocean was probably understood at the time as more akin 
to establishing rights of navigation and control of trade routes, rather than actual ownership 
of the seas. Steinberg argues that the line should be seen as a starting point from which you 
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either race East or West, claiming land.102 The sea is understood as being travelled over, and 
rights of travel are given, but it does not distribute territory, and neither Spain nor Portugal 
understood these Papal bulls as giving them sovereign control of the ocean. It does divide 
the sea, but divides movement rather than territory. In this period the sea is a space within 
which states can compete in a ‘test of strength’,103 to assert exclusive trade routes between 
resource extraction sites, processing sites, and markets.104 These sites become amenable to 
territorial claim, but the sea between them is simply a space to travel over.105  
Elden states that Tordesillas was a ‘break with the idea that simply occupation led to 
possession’, and the start of dividing land(s) by calculative measures.106 The line actually 
preceded the ability to measure this precise longitude. The techniques required to make 
such claims were developed and improved in this period, precisely for the purpose of 
establishing where this line was. The process of map making and line drawing led the 
process of boundary marking, and these lines had to be translated onto the ground.107 As 
Matthew Edney has put it, ‘Empire is a cartographic construction’,108 the making of maps 
and the making of empires happen together. Advances in navigation and geometry were 
needed to produce the best claim to these lands. The claim of territory quickly developed 
from being based in discovery or occupation, to being based in scientific calculation.  
Steinberg emphasises that the Treaty did not grant, and was not understood as granting, 
territory over the sea. Grotius and others would oppose this idea as a straw man. The treaty 
actually divided the sea into different zones for the exercise of power.109 The nature of the 
sea was ignored. It was simply understood as something to be travelled over to reach 
resources. Lines were drawn as if the space was entirely empty, and maps from this period 
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do exactly the same.110 This line has no meaning in terms of control of the sea, and has no 
effect on the ocean itself, its meaning arises from the social practices around it. At its 
enunciation, it simply declared that the Spanish and the Portuguese should travel in 
different directions whilst searching for new lands. 
The legal historian Lauren Benton emphasises that Tordesillas did not grant sovereignty.111 
The spheres of influence given in the treaty and associated bulls actually opened up the seas 
for inter-imperial competition. The technical difficulty of finding the lines meant that it 
could never operate to divide the world, but actually operated to increase the competition 
between the two Kingdoms over title to different lands. Sovereignty would only be achieved 
over newly discovered lands if accompanied with other supporting proof, such as mapping, 
the founding of communities, and administrative actions supporting discovery. Benton 
argues that ‘[t]he same treaty that appears to represent the extra-European world as an 
object of European imperial rule instead shows the ways it stimulated a fluid geographic 
discourse and open-ended legal politics’.112  
The treaty of Tordesillas in historical focus appears as a perfect example of the striation 
which Deleuze and Guattari wrote about, as well as demonstrating the diagrammatic 
function of this line as social before it is technical. The line was an attempt to order and 
control this space, but partly due to the physical environment and partly due to the nature 
of inter-imperial competition, this did not happen. Thus the sea is clearly subjected to 
formal striation, which is then smoothed once more. This line did not decide territorial 
claims; it merely indicated two spheres of influence. But its meaning was reconstructed as 
the situation changed. In the 16th century both Portugal and Spain began to claim that the 
line should go around the globe, giving their party control of the Spice Islands, depending on 
how the line was drawn.113 The line in the sea was quickly applied to the land, most 
obviously in the north east corner of South America which roughly makes up modern day 
Brazil, where it had instant and important effects. This line was treated as a very real and 
meaningful one when Grotius began his legal argument over a century later. 
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Mare Liberum and International Courts of the Sea 
Mare Liberum was a revised chapter from Grotius’ unpublished De Jure Praedae (DJP), 
published at the request of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) directors to ‘have the right 
of navigation – which is competent to the Dutch nation over the whole wide world – 
thoroughly examined and adduced with rational as well as legal arguments’.114 The purpose 
of publishing this chapter was to assist in diplomatic negotiations between the States 
General of the Netherlands, French and English ambassadors, and representatives of Philip 
III, King of Spain and Portugal. The DEIC directors were keen to protect their interests in the 
East Indies, and the military successes recently gained. Mare Liberum is a justification of 
Dutch activity in the East Indies. The focus is on the rights of the community of mankind, 
and in particular the property rights of all mankind, drawing heavily from Seneca and 
Cicero.115 The famous work concerns how a state might gain control or ownership of a sea 
route, and it deals with two main Portuguese claims – title by conquest and title by the 
Pope’s gift and then in the treaty. 
The Portuguese had managed to control access to the East Indies for a long time, not 
through force or ownership of any particular sea routes, but by owning and controlling the 
knowledge of the sea routes. It took an adventurous Dutch sailor to break this monopoly, 
Jan van Linschoten, ‘the Dutch Marco Polo’.116 His work was published in 1596 and soon the 
Dutch and the English were competing with the Portuguese in the East Indies. In February 
1603 a Dutch merchant sailor, Jacob van Heemskerck, captured the Portuguese merchant 
vessel, the Santa Catarina. This ship yielded a prize worth three million Dutch guilders, 
about equivalent to the total annual expenditure of the English government at the time.117 
The ship was confiscated by the Amsterdam Admiralty Court on 4th September 1604, and 
declared a good prize on the 9th September. Hugo Grotius was approached by the directors 
of the DEIC to write a defence of the seizure of this ship, which became DJP.118 In arguing 
this case, Grotius was provided with copious materials, in particular van Heemskerck’s 
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correspondence and a collection of Dutch sailors’ testaments against the actions of the 
Portuguese in the East Indies.119 
The argument in DJP is focused on demonstrating that the Portuguese, in attempting to 
control trade in the East Indies, were violating natural law. As a result van Heemskerk, who 
did not have a privateering commission, was justified in taking this prize as compensation 
for this wrong. Under natural law, Grotius argued, a private individual could punish another 
for a breach of this law.  
The content of Mare Liberum has been often examined,120 here I want to focus on it as an 
example of international law coming from the sea. It is worth emphasising that DJP was 
written to support the decision of an admiralty court to award a ship as a good prize. Hugo 
Grotius, like Gentili before him, was engaging with the practice of international law in the 
admiralty courts.121 Admiralty courts at this time were an early forum for the development 
of international law in practice. Arguably, the courts were self-aware that this is what they 
were doing, as seen in statements such as that from a 17th century English admiralty judge 
that ‘the [court of admiralty] judge is ... obliged to observe the law of nations ... as the 
judges of the courts of Westminster are bound to proceed according to statutes and the 
common law’.122 And while the courts and judges may have not seen themselves as part of a 
system for governing the oceans, the sailors who would make use of these courts certainly 
could.  
In her book A Search for Sovereignty Benton puts forward a history of 17th century seafaring 
in which the sailors operate along ‘corridors of control’, and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans 
as criss-crossed by these corridors and vectors of legal, political, navigational and military 
control.123 The authority of admiralty courts and privateering letters of marque, joined with 
the authority of maps and navigational techniques, allowed European states to project their 
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authority into these ocean spaces in specific ways. Merchants, privateers and pirates all 
followed this system to some extent. Merchants were restricted to certain routes of 
navigation, and certain ports where they could trade. Privateers needed commissions from 
states authorising them to plunder other ships. Even pirates, the great symbol of freedom 
outside the law, in reality followed this system, attempting to operate at the very edges of 
legitimacy and blur the lines between pirate and privateer. The pirate in Benton’s account is 
actually so deeply engaged with the law and legal argument as to be fairly described as a 
‘lawyer at sea’.124 
This interplay of different legal ideas and regimes all overlapping at sea, a sea very much 
covered by law, can actually be found in DJP, as opposed to Mare Liberum with its focus on 
freedom for navigation. Grotius started with natural law and a unique claim, that ‘it is 
evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the 
State’.125 Grotius starts from a natural right of individuals to judge and punish which was 
transferred to the sovereign authority.126 As a result, the violation of the natural rights of 
individuals is a just cause for war. As he says in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ‘It is evident that the 
sources from which wars arise are as numerous as those from which lawsuits spring; for 
where judicial settlement fails, war begins’.127 Grotius started with the argument that the 
actions of the Portuguese, in attempting to restrict Dutch trade in the East Indies, breached 
natural law.128 This gave rise to the right of a private individual to punish the Portuguese for 
this, and for their crimes against third parties, in a just war.  
This image of the individual operating according to natural law whilst in the East Indies and 
punishing others for their breaches again portrays the sea as external and other. It is an 
image of a smooth place of events and intensities as described earlier. But that was not the 
only argument Grotius had. Grotius argued for a variety of legal justifications for the seizure 
of the Portuguese ship. Starting from natural law, Grotius also considered the extension of 
public authority over sea space, the right to use force in certain circumstances and Roman 
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law doctrines of property and ownership. Benton highlights that the existence of a just war 
between the Dutch people and the Portuguese was also an important argument. It was the 
basis for a series of public law arguments invoking vectors of Dutch jurisdiction covering the 
manner and place of the seizure of the ship. The Santa Catarina in this argument comes 
under Dutch jurisdiction, with the captain of a Dutch ship ‘granted jurisdiction by the state’ 
and ‘empowered – in the absence of other judges ... to impose punishment’.129 This form of 
jurisdiction was not territorially limited, and did not require any claim to have territory over 
the area. Instead it emphasised the ship as connected to the sovereign, as an island of law 
which could bring the right to protect subjects and their goods with it around the world.  
Returning to Benton’s lawyers at sea – pirates – the extensive use of flawed commissions 
and the forum shopping between different admiralty jurisdictions to find a favourable prize 
court defined the law of prizes by defining its limits. We see this specifically in DJP and the 
facts of the case. Van Heemskerck produced paperwork and quasi-legal documents to justify 
his actions. In particular he wrote to the directors of the Company informing them of crimes 
committed by the Portuguese against the Dutch and his intention ‘to find a way to revenge 
the calamity that befell our men at Macao’.130 Before carrying out his attack, he also drafted 
a policy document setting out his plans and their legal basis which all his officers signed. This 
is all part of the practice of the law of prizes at sea.  
In Grotius, pirates provide a focus for the elaboration of the freedom of the seas. In both the 
unpublished DJP and De Jure Belli ac Pacis Grotius discusses pirates, and allows for their 
punishment.131 The punishment of piracy is the paradigm example of the right of private 
citizens to punish somebody in breach of the law of nature and of nations. In responding to 
the argument of William Welwod, Grotius clarified that such a right of punishment, such a 
jurisdiction at sea, did not equate to ownership or sovereignty at sea. Referring to the 
Roman idea of ‘mare nostrum’, Grotius argued that the Romans did no more than exercise a 
‘common right which other free peoples also enjoy’.132 By considering pirates, Grotius 
develops a distinction between jurisdiction and sovereignty, and argues for a form of 
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universal jurisdiction over pirates. In particular, it is the pirate’s position on the sea which is 
important, as the sea is the smooth conduit between nations, which the pirate threatens. It 
is the ocean’s smoothness which creates the pirate, and the striating of universal 
jurisdiction.  
As the English turned against pirates in the 18th century, the law of prizes became, in 
Benton’s words, ‘an early example of global administrative law’, setting rules for trade, 
travel and jurisdiction.133 The admiralty courts created a network of international law 
covering the oceans. Politically, freedom of the seas remained an important doctrine, but 
legal practice in these courts understood the sea as covered with different sorts of 
jurisdiction.  Legal arguments about the law of the sea and international law were bound up 
with privateering, merchant imperialism, and piracy. The idea of rights of jurisdiction 
separate to actual ownership, a divisible form of sovereignty, was developed specifically in 
the context of the sea, and then deployed to devastating effect on land by colonial 
empires.134  
As the law of the sea entered the 19th century, slavery and its slow abolition became the 
focus. Slavery can be seen as part of a struggle over jurisdiction, and what was permitted 
where in empire.135 A focus on the anti-slavery courts of the 19th century, and the policing of 
this ‘original crime against humanity’, reveal another system of treaties and jurisdictions, 
with anti-slavery ships being able to stop the slave trade only when there was an agreement 
in place. Jenny Martinez gives the leading account of this history, and the evocative image of 
the anti-slavery British naval ship captain armed with copies of bilateral treaties to 
compliment his cannons.136  This captain would have to let French and American slave ships 
pass, for want of such a treaty, highlighting a still partial and fragmented legal regime, which 
continued to show the tensions of striation and smoothness, and designate people as inside 
and outside the system.  
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UNCLOS 
The 20th century gave us UNCLOS, a treaty intended to ‘settle, in a spirit of mutual 
understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea’.137 In terms of 
spatial issues, UNCLOS establishes several different maritime zones. The first is the 
territorial sea, which extends sovereignty for 12 nautical miles (nm) off the shore of a 
coastal state.138 As a result the area becomes territory, in Elden’s sense, as a bounded space 
under the control of a people. But its ‘boundedness’ remains largely hypothetical, since the 
actual material of the sea moves, and literally cannot be bounded. The control is becoming 
more concrete, in certain states, with sophisticated navigation and military technologies, 
but the practice of recognising every coastal state as having this ‘territory’ precedes any 
being able to clearly define and control it.139  
The next zone is the contiguous zone.140 This is a further 12nm of sea over which a state can 
exercise limited sovereignty, specifically for customs, immigration, and sanitary regulation. 
This is then followed by the Exclusive Economic Zone of up to 200nm.141 Here, a state has 
sovereign rights for ‘activities for the economic exploitation of the zone’, over the water, 
soil and sub-soil, and over living and non-living resources.142 UNCLOS also grants 
‘jurisdiction’ in this area for artificial islands, scientific research, and protection of the 
environment. The final major zone is the continental shelf.143 This is the ‘seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin’.144 A state may 
extend the rights over the seabed beyond 200nm where the natural prolongation is beyond 
this. This can be calculated in a number of complicated ways, involving thicknesses, depths, 
and something called an isobath. Referrals can be made to the expert body of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.145  
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This process of gradation exactly matches the striation process outlined from the start. The 
sea under UNCLOS is divided up in a way which can never have physical reality due to the 
sea’s materiality, the fact that it moves constantly. Even the shelf, which is an extension of 
the land, is defined partly by reference to the sea. Claims to a continental shelf also do not 
have to have any basis in physical geography where they are less than 200nm. At sea we can 
see very clearly conflict between the abstract certainty of law and the uncertainty of 
physical geography.  
The regime over the sea then continues to declare what can and can’t be done in different 
places, based on measurements which only make sense on charts or maps, and have little 
material reality. The shelf is different, this is treated more like land, and thus the 
complicated special regime. It is also worth considering that the shelf contains mineral 
resources, whereas the main way of exploiting the sea for economic gain remains travel 
over it. This may change if deep seabed mining becomes commercially viable, and the 
recent increase in contractors seeking licenses to mine demands attention.146 The modern 
law of the sea still enshrines freedom of travel over the high seas, just as Grotius argued for, 
even in the territorial sea, where the right of innocent passage has no counterpart in land 
based territory. 
The measurement of all these zones is a fiction of the law developed on the basis of 
understanding the sea as a blank canvas. While sophisticated satellite navigation may be 
able to pin point the different zones, they still exist only on maps. Furthermore, even with 
exact measuring, the question of where you measure from is unsettled. The starting point is 
the low water line,147 but this is very hard to define precisely, and a range of different 
definitions can be adopted.148 The practice of baseline drawing for complicated coasts, bays, 
and islands, and the encircling of archipelagos to call some sea ‘internal’, takes us back to 
nothing more than line drawing on empty, featureless ocean. The law continues to treat the 
sea as an abstract entity, certainly when it comes to these questions of sovereignty, 
territory and jurisdiction.  
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The high seas, under article 87, remain free and ‘open to all states’. It is also the part, part 
VII of UNCLOS, which brings people at sea in to view. Part VII contains the prohibitions on 
piracy, transport of slaves, smuggling of drugs, and the duty to render assistance. Article 
98(1) sets out a duty for states to require the master of any ship ‘to render assistance to any 
person found at sea in danger of being lost’. This duty to assist is enacted through domestic 
legislation, the treaty itself does not impose the obligation. The broad terms ‘any person’ 
and ‘assistance’ do not provide much clarity as to what the duty to render assistance 
actually entails. Other legal sources come into play, most obviously the related 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1979 International Convention 
on Maritime Search and Rescue, but more significantly the 1951 Refugee Convention.149 
International human rights also come into consideration, particularly the principle of non-
refoulement.150 Where a person rescued indicates that they might be a refugee, this does 
not place a legal duty on the flag state of that ship to offer them asylum. The master of the 
ship must take them to the next port of call, but under duty of non-refoulement this must 
not be to a territory ‘where their life or freedom would be threatened’.151 There is a gap in 
all of this regulation, in that the state which is the next port of call is not under a duty to 
accept those rescued. 
The most recent addition to the law in this area is UNSC resolution 2240 (2015) authorising 
under chapter VII member states to intercept, inspect and seize vessels engaged in 
smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean.152 This is part of operation Triton, the 
successor to the Italian operation Mare Nostrum. Triton is a border enforcement operation, 
part of Frontex, rather than a humanitarian operation. It was launched in 2014 with one 
third of the budget of the Italian operation, no mandate for proactive search and rescue, 
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and much criticism, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees describing it as ‘woefully 
inadequate’.153 As the crisis developed in 2015, the funding was increased and the European 
Council put together an action plan, which involved the use of force in the territorial waters 
of Libya and was ultimately permitted by the Security Council resolution.154 Clearly, use of 
force against people smugglers, using similar tactics to those against pirates and drug 
smugglers, is a very different practice to assisting those in danger at sea.  
The European refugee crisis is a crisis of the sea. The reinforcement of European borders, 
such as the 100 mile fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border, force people fleeing to take 
boats. Approximately 1 million people arrived in Europe over the sea in 2015.155 Another 3 
million refugees are predicted to travel to Europe in 2016.156 These seas that are free and 
open for trade and the transport of goods, are closed, chaotic, lethal places for refugees. 
The sea is not free for those fleeing. The chapter VII UNSC resolution allowing for the use of 
force was the response of Europe and the international community to unprecedented 
numbers of people drowning in the Mediterranean, and in particular to the image of Aylan 
Kurdi. The law opens and closes these doors, it makes the sea free and flat for trade and 
exchange, but rough and closed for people.  
People at Sea 
The refugee at sea is not a new phenomenon, but the problem of the refugee at sea, of 
where they are to go, is a particular problem of modernity.  The term ‘boat people’ was 
coined in relation to refugees fleeing Indochina in the late 1970s.157 Since then there exists 
an uninterrupted history of tragedy as people drown at sea fleeing persecution, or simply in 
search of a better life. In a 1979 interview on this topic, Michel Foucault gave his thoughts 
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on the refugee problem.158 There are several prescient points made there. Firstly, Foucault 
is in no doubt that the history of imperial occupation is the cause of many of the problems 
in Cambodia and Vietnam. Talk of ‘transit centres’ to process those who want to leave 
‘sounds strangely like a system of concentration camps’.159 Dictatorship and repression 
forces people to try to escape once they lose the strength to resist. The borders of post-
colonial states, ‘arbitrarily drawn’, are also to blame, for creating tensions and hostilities 
within populations. Finally, the developed states no longer need migrants to form their 
surplus labour, as technological advancement has lessened the need for imported labour 
and they are closing their borders. Foucault concludes that the refugee problem of the late 
1970s is ‘not just a sequel to the past, but a presage to the future’.160 
Foucault’s simplified analysis of the refugee problem has clear explanatory power for the 
current European crisis. The middle east and north Africa, covered in arbitrarily drawn lines 
calculated in 19th and early 20th century Europe, has been subject to sustained military 
attack from within and without for decades. There are specific practices of exploitation 
carried out by western states in the places refugees come from which make life there 
intolerable. As Ambalavaner Sivanandan put it, ‘we are here because you are there’.161 The 
borders have collapsed, most notably perhaps the border between Iraq and Syria, based on 
the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916. Simultaneously the borders of Europe have been 
reinforced, most recently with the announcement in December 2015 of a new ‘European 
Border and Coast Guard’ to further enforce Europe’s external borders with the specific aim 
of trying to preserve the internal Schengen area without borders.162 All that’s left is the sea. 
The territorial line, first drawn on the sea and then taken on to the land, the violence of this 
line has driven people from one home and shut them out of any potential new one. 
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The refugee captures this problem I have been exploring here. It is the person who is 
excluded by law, placed on the other side of a line, striated into illegality.163 As Catherine 
Dauvergne argues, refugee law is about crisis, it operates in a paradigm of crisis, not 
resolution.164 The refugee only exists in crisis, obviously, but this logic structures the whole 
regime of refugee law. The refugee camp is the crisis alternative to politically impossible 
resettlement or repatriation. The refugee camp is a temporary response to a crisis, no 
matter that some camps have now lasted years.165 The boat of refugees arriving on shore is 
also a crisis image, played on TV news under frightening headlines. Dauvergne also argues 
that refugees breach western sovereignty in that refugee law imposes obligations on the 
state where they arrive.166 For states in the Global South which boarder ‘refugee producing 
nations’, their sovereignty is obliterated by the arrival of tens of thousands who cannot be 
turned away.167 In this way the refugee regime is a proxy measure of sovereignty. We need 
only compare the response to the refugee crisis in the UK, which settled accepted 1,000 
refugees in 2015, and Lebanon, where over 1 million Syrians are refugees, 1 in 5 people in 
the country.168 The crisis of refugees looks very different depending on what sort of state 
the refugee arrives in.  
It is also in refugee law where we find the individual in international law, far more so than in 
human rights law. Dauvergne highlights that the text of the refugee conventions is the most 
interpreted and applied text in international law, reinterpreted and reapplied in every 
individual asylum claim.169 There were 1.66 million asylum applications in 2014.170 Refugee 
law imposes duties on states, in terms of receiving, protecting, resettling, that are not held 
back by issues of responsibility, jurisdiction etc. The refugee is an international person, 
unhinged from a state by circumstance. 
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A final important point made by Dauvergne is that, contra Agamben, the refugee and the 
refugee camp are not outside politics, as Homo Sacer is. The analogy of the refugee camp 
and the concentration camp is powerful and meaningful, but they separate here as the 
refugee is at the heart of 21st century law and politics.  Agamben’s work does have use here 
when we consider the failed asylum seeker, a figure truly located outside of law and politics, 
in a negative space of bare life. The refugee challenges the state, it is an individual challenge 
against states more fundamental than any human right, it is simply a claim that life has 
value.  
Returning again to Deleuze and Guattari, they explain that the refugee is not a nomad.171 To 
flee is not nomadic. Refugees have had their very bodies striated, being from somewhere, 
labelled and outside. The war machine makes space smooth again, ‘but, in the strangest of 
reversals, it is for the purpose of controlling striated space more completely’.172 Aerial 
bombing then, and drone warfare,173 have dominated and controlled the places fled from. 
21st century capitalism also functions with the logic of the war machine. The refugees are 
then met with an enhanced striation of border fences and militarily patrolled seas. As they 
say, ‘the smooth itself can be drawn and occupied by diabolical powers of organisation’.174 It 
is the organisation of the physical world through law which produces the migrant, the 
refugee, the need for them to flee, and their death in the sea. 
The pirate is quite possibly the figure who connects the clearly intertwined history of 
imperialism, capitalism and international law.175 As Gerry Simpson has compellingly argued, 
the pirate may well be the modern ‘defining motif’ of international law, its ‘foundational 
bête noir’.176 Piracy is the first international crime, and the first offence to give rise to 
universal jurisdiction.177 It is also the existence of this enemy which creates the international 
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community to wage war against it, the international community which is also responsible 
for refugees.178 The enemies of mankind create mankind, and vice versa, another 
simultaneity fitting with the process of smoothing and striating. 
Piracy offers one potential more positive view of people at sea. If the sea is the smooth 
space par excellence, then pirates may be the archetypal nomads. The pirate constructed or 
constructs the social space of the ocean differently. In Benton’s account the pirate is a 
lawyer, but Marcus Rediker depicts the seaman generally, and the pirate particularly, very 
differently, as a mobile culture and community.179 It does not do much violence to the 
anthropological meaning of the term to name pirates as nomads. As a people who come 
‘from the sea’,180 from a mobile space, characterised by movement. Rediker argues that the 
egalitarian politics of seafarers arose from their nomadism, and that egalitarian social 
organisation is inherent to nomadic ways of life.181 This leads us back from people to place, 
via Deleuze and Guattari. They argue that ‘nomads have no history, only geography’.182 
Nomads exist on smooth space, and the pirate and the sea are nomads on smooth space. 
The potential of this smooth space is that ‘a heterogeneous smooth space is wedded to a 
very particular type of multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities which 
occupy space without counting it’.183 Or, as Kuhn paraphrases, the smooth space allows for 
‘self-determined, creative “free” forms of life’.184  
It is ridiculous to try and celebrate the refugee camp as a potential egalitarian space, and yet 
moments like the camp on the rocks at Ventimiglia185 on the Italy-France border offer a 
glimpse of how this unparalleled movement of people must fundamentally challenge the 
reproduction of life in Europe. At the same time, privately run refugee camps produce profit 
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amid conditions which are ‘beneath human dignity’.186 The brutality and hypocrisy of a 
globalised, borderless world is laid bare here, where multinational corporations can move 
between jurisdictions providing the full suite of options in the confinement of unwanted 
people187 whilst the only hope is to try and live in the gaps at the border. The gap, the 
disjuncture, the rupture, this a feature of Foucault and Deleuze’s thinking. Here the 
‘concrete assemblages...crack’ and show us how the machine works.188 A drowned child in 
the spring of 2015 showed us how the machine works. 
WHEN THE SHIP COMES IN  
This article demonstrates the importance of considering the interaction of law, space and 
people. From Grotius to UNCLOS, international law has assisted in the process of striating 
the seas, making them featureless and amenable for capital. Schmitt understood this, even 
if he did not understand that the sea was simultaneously a challenge to this. Allott saw the 
potential for the sea as an external and alternative site for the development of a new 
international public law, but was not able to see how that could translate back on to land. 
The sea is where international law pioneered its practices of territorialisation. It is 
simultaneously the space which best undermines this attempt, whether it is refugees on a 
boat, fish which won’t respond to zoning regulations, or the simple fact that the sea moves. 
Thinking with the sea productively brings together geophysics and geopolitics. 
International law needs more thinking about space. The sea, ‘a space of fluidity, volume, 
emergence, depth, and liquidity’,189 offers an excellent opportunity.  Steinberg’s work 
reemphasises the importance of the ocean in the making of the modern world. I want to 
emphasise the importance of the ocean for a modern world made in part through 
international law. There remains much to say about the blue spaces on the map between 
the traditional subjects of international law, both in the way that space has been 
                                                     
186
 UNHCR report on the Traiskirchen camp in Austria run by ORS Service, as quoted in A Loewenstein ‘How 
private companies are exploiting the refugee crisis for profit’, The Independent (23 October 2015) available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/how-companies-have-been-exploiting-the-refugee-crisis-for-profit-
a6706587.html (last accessed 11 January 2016). 
187
 It is no coincidence that companies such as Serco seek to profit from the privatisation of immigration 
detention centres as well as hospitals, prisons, schools and public transport.  
188
 Deleuze (1988) 38. 
189
 Steinberg and Peters (2015) 260. 
35 
 
constructed, and what that can tell us about the inside of international law, the 
territorialised nation state.  
The practice of drawing lines on empty spaces on maps may have started at sea, but it is the 
signature style of colonial cartography, and also of a great deal of city planning.190 This 
construction of space was worked out at sea, through processes such as the negotiation and 
enforcement of the treaty of Tordesillas, and then transposed to land. This line drawing is 
when territory started, it is the moment when control of a space was abstracted away from 
occupation or possession. Lines are never just on maps. It is when people encounter the 
force of a border that they experience the violence that is needed to make those lines real. 
It is in the refugee crisis that we see the striation of the seas ultimately become the striation 
of individuals. The biggest political and human crisis of the 21st century is this refugee crisis. 
It is a crisis of the sea which challenges the meaning and existence of sovereignty and of the 
state. It is a crisis which demands that we understand how international law has historically 
and continues to produce space.   
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